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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO

United States Mission Berlin,
Berlin, Germany,
July 12, 1963.

OFFICIAL-INFORMAL
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Dear John:

You asked me on June 4 to let you know at my earliest convenience the status of contingency planning for events within Berlin. I think that much of what you requested has already become known to you in one way or another, but I am nevertheless sorry it took such a long time for my earliest convenience to arrive. I am afraid, however, that this in itself is reflective of the state of affairs here and in turn also explains why more contingency planning is not done in Berlin. Without belaboring the subject, I should mention that, even at the best of times, when the Soviets and East Germans are leaving us pretty much alone, none of the three Missions in Berlin has more than a very small proportion of its time left over from dealing with current operations for application to forward planning. On the US side, for example, I spend a good half of my time briefing one of my superiors or one of the many visitors to Berlin. (There has in the last few months been a heavy stream particularly of military officers through here.) Much of the internal briefing is in preparation for the complex rounds of Kommandatura meetings. Most of the rest of the time is spent in providing political guidance for local operations, for military plans or for studies prepared by one of the military staffs. This last aspect gets worse rather than better with increased activity by ASB, and we find that the available political judgment in Berlin is spread pretty thin. I am afraid the net result is that the political officers in all three Missions, but particularly in ours, are kept too busy reacting to situations or to other peoples' initiatives to take all the initiatives which they themselves should exercise.

/The point

John C. Ausland, Esquire,
Berlin Task Force,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

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The point of all this, if there is any point beyond just a mild quarrel with destiny, is that planning or study assignments should not too casually be sent off to Berlin, since they strain the resources here very substantially and are likely not to be done very promptly. I do not have here anything like the time I had in Washington to devote to planning, for example.

You will have received by this time from Bonn copies of tripartite plans which have been prepared here, but I enclose an additional copy in any case. The only one of any importance is the "Outline of Allied Actions in the Event of Denial of Entry Into East Berlin." I also enclose a copy of a paper I prepared and submitted to the British and French as a basis for the generalized planning you hoped to have by July 15 or earlier. As you see, we are tending away from the detailed listing of countermeasures per contingency, and toward a general assessment of goals and capabilities on both sides. This not only suits our slim budget of resources, but also is a more realistic and more fruitful way of preparing for a future which is composed of an infinite number of minor variables but has general outlines which have become familiar to all.

It would be relevant to discuss, in connection with our capability for planning, the usefulness of the new Tripartite Working Group. We have the future of this group under review at the present time, however, and aside from saying that it has not materially lightened the burden of the regular political staffs, I would prefer not to go into any detail.

Let me also, with this letter, refer to your letter of May 23 to Bob Magill on dismounting procedures. Your first two paragraphs describing the procedures for the US and the UK are correct. BQD CC-17 is incorrect and obviously has confused a US position of the summer of 1962, in which eight vehicles were involved in the advance notice procedure and forty men in the dismount procedure. This position was abandoned when it proved impossible to reach tripartite agreement on a common set of procedures, although the eight vehicles figure was subsequently adopted in US advance notice practice. We in USBER believe that the British dismount procedures have much to recommend them, and we are working with the Brigade on a project looking toward revision of our own. I still believe that joint procedures are advisable if only for optical reasons, but I also think that anyone who finds our procedures difficult to support in the clutch because they seem illogical or unreasonable is missing the point entirely.

I am not sure whether you have heard from Martin in response to your June 11 letter about the playing of games, but for my part I am afraid I would have to sacrifice other things which are of more immediate importance in order to do justice to such an exercise. For another thing, when I have

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time for speculative thought, I like to ponder where the next few years will take us given solely the pressures exerted on our position from the Western side. I am thinking of Brandt and what appears to be his drive for a new look in Berlin, of the post-Adenauer era in Bonn with its emphasis on German national interest, et cetera.

We have wondered when you will make your semiannual swing around the circuit. We look forward to seeing you in Berlin, but I assume you will wish to be at the switch in Washington around the middle of August.

Sincerely,



Arthur R. Day
Chief, Political Affairs Section

Enclosures:

1. Copy No. 39 of Coordinated Study dated May 6, 1963.
2. Thermo-fax copy of paper entitled "Planning for Contingencies Within Berlin" dated July 8, 1963.

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